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1 Introduction
Côte d’Ivoire used to be known in sub-Saharan
Africa for its political stability, but the 1990s
revealed social and economic fragilities which
plunged the country into precarious unrest and
instability. The coup of 1999 and the
unsuccessful coup attempt of September 2002
were manifest illustrations of this socioeconomic
and political fragility. Since then, Côte d’Ivoire
has suffered from outbreaks of violence,
especially in Abidjan and in the west of the
country. For many specialists, the crisis is one of
identity (Dembélé et al. 2002). However,
according to our field analysis in the most
affected areas, the question of land tenure is by
far the most important issue. Indeed, the most
affected area in Côte d’Ivoire is the western
region of the country, the most important one for
cocoa production. The region has attracted a
number of migrants from neighbouring
countries, especially from Burkina Faso but also
Mali and Guinea, as well as internal migrants
from the Baoulé region. The land tenure issue
has become politicised and the question of Ivoirité
(i.e. ‘Ivorianness’ – a radical ethno-nationalist
understanding of Ivorian citizenship) has been
instrumentalised to the needs of the most
powerful in the region. As a result, local
incidents can easily become regional conflicts
and create national tensions. 
The split of Côte d’Ivoire cannot be understood
within the constructed borders imagined by the
politicians or even those drawn as a result of the
Linas-Marcoussis agreement.1 Those authors
who follow such an analysis usually wrongly
describe this split as between ‘a governmental
Christian and animist zone in the South versus a
rebel Muslim zone in the North’ (see the
criticism by Bassett 2003). The west has been the
epicentre of violence since the beginning of the
civil war in 2002. The political crisis that
resulted from the 2010 presidential elections
escalated into a full-scale military conflict
between forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo, the
president of Côte d’Ivoire since 2000, and
supporters of the internationally recognised
president-elect Alassane Ouattara, with again
the west as the geostrategic centre of the
military battlefield. The interesting paradox of
the 2011 post-electoral crisis is that except for
the massacres in Duékoué (see Table 1), violence
has been more limited in urban centres (in terms
of numbers of events and the scale in proportion
to the size of the area). This is not the case in
rural areas where cycles of revenge and
retaliation have continued well after the post-
electoral crisis. The objective of this article is to
highlight a number of factors that could explain
this dynamic of restraint in urban areas in the
west, and to explain why there has not been
72
The Dynamics of Restraint in 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Jeremy Allouche and Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi*
Abstract Research on conflict prevention has mainly focused on the causes of war and post-conflict
reconstruction. Our knowledge on how civilians manage to contain violence in unstable and conflict
environments is, however, very limited. This article aims to understand, in the context of the civil war in Côte
d’Ivoire, how and why ‘islands of peace’ emerge during outbreaks of violence. It identifies both the local and
structural conditions and mechanisms (including formal and informal) that help to mitigate violence and
encourage restraint in conflict-affected and unstable situations. Our research and analysis has focused on the
western region, which is the epicentre of violence. Semi-structured interviews with Young Patriots members,
the military, the business community, representatives of women’s NGOs, traditional leaders and representatives
of the religious community, along with interviews in Abidjan, provided the primary data for our analysis.
IDS Bulletin Volume 44  Number 1  January 2013   © 2013 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © 2013 Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
direct violence against the civilian population in
urban areas in the context of the post-electoral
crisis. This research angle is interesting and
original (if not provocative) in the sense that
there are not many, if any, sociological and
political analyses which have looked in detail at
the dynamics of restraint during civil war. 
This article is divided into four parts: the
following section will review the relevant
literature while sections 3 to 7 will focus
respectively on the west as the epicentre of the
conflict, a presentation of the cities visited for
this research and an explanation of why violence
was absent or restrained in a number of places.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Inverting the question 
How can we explain why physical violence during
a civil war is limited to a specific geographical
area? This has become a classic puzzle in recent
studies on violence and civil war. Kalyvas (2006),
for example, starts his book with the example of
two very similar and contiguous Greek villages in
the peninsula of the Peloponnese that faced two
different trajectories: one resulted in a general
massacre while the other prevented this type of
violence. These micro-level theories on violence
and civil war (see also Varshney 2002; Wood
2003) have clearly shifted the debate away from
the habitually cited causes of group division (e.g.
social or ethnic polarisation) that often fail to
account for the actual dynamics of violence. In
fact, these new theories have been very successful
in explaining the causes of variation in violence
and distinguishing them from a general theory of
conflict and war. However, most academics,
whether Varshney (2002) in terms of social
cohesion or Kalyvas (2006) in terms of levels of
territorial contestation, use the same variables to
explain both the prevalence of violence and its
absence. However, one could contend that the
political dynamics of the avoidance of violence
can be separated from those of violence. 
Like many large-scale modern violent conflicts,
the war in Côte d’Ivoire was a combination of
conventional warfare between military
insurgents and the army, and targeted violence
by both insurgents and the army against non-
combatants. This article will focus on the latter
but wishes to invert the debate by examining
spaces where this violence did not happen. Our
general ‘obsession’ as human beings has been to
try to understand rationally why ‘other’ human
beings commit violence, thereby ignoring how
individuals and groups have managed to escape
from this violence during periods of armed
conflict. In general, these third party actors have
been seen as passive, as the storylines and
analyses of most civil wars focus on the
insurgents and the army. There have been a few
stories and narratives of acts of resistance that
were reported in Rwanda, for example, but these
are just anecdotes that fail to illustrate the
potential political strategies that are used by
non-combatants to escape violence. 
Recent work by Blattman and Miguel (2009: 1)
argues that micro-level analysis and data are
needed to better understand the roots of war and
the behaviour of armed groups. The same stands
for the dynamics of restraint (Straus 2012). The
principal aim of this article is therefore to use
Côte d’Ivoire to discuss how and why ‘islands of
peace’ emerge during civil war. The crisis in Côte
d’Ivoire has not received much scholarly attention.
Most of the political analyses have displayed a
stereotyped understanding of the dynamics of the
conflict as a north–south issue, basically a
religious conflict between the Christian South and
the Muslim North. There are, of course, more
serious analyses on the long-term causes of the
civil war (e.g. see Dozon 2011) but there is no
clear micro-level analysis and data, especially for
the west (for Abidjan, see Banegas 2011). These
micro-level dynamics are central to supporting
our understanding of the crisis, and providing a
link between the political crisis and the logic of
violence. 
3 The conceptual puzzle
Our conceptual puzzle is a difficult one, as there
is not an explicit literature on the topic. Given
the reverse focus of existing research (the logic
of violence rather than of its constraints – the
only exception being Straus 2012), let us first
assume that in most instances the absence of
violence is the opposite of violence. What are the
key indicators that could be used to demonstrate
how and why communities or individuals would
choose to avoid violence during civil war? 
The literature on the logic of violence is still in
its infancy and most of it focuses on the dynamics
of civil war. This literature poses several
analytical challenges. First, it is unclear whether
and how the dynamics of civil war are distinctive
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from ‘interstate war, terrorism, coups, communal
violence, political repression, and crime’
(Blattman and Miguel 2009: 4). Second, most
analysts have assumed that the dynamics of civil
war are universally the same. Although a number
of patterns and mechanisms stand out in the
literature and hypotheses on the roots of civil
war and potential causal dynamics are available,
a robust body of generalisable research remains
out of reach (Blattman and Miguel 2009). 
It is important to understand the dynamics of civil
war as it will likely determine the logic of violence.
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) have identified three
different categories of violence in civil war:
‘conventional’, ‘irregular/guerrilla warfare’ and
‘symmetric non-conventional’. While it is difficult
to characterise a particular conflict in precise (or
specific) categories, the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire
could be described as a conventional civil war.
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) separate two distinct
strands for irregular warfare, namely minor
peripheral wars and insurgencies with a radical
Islamist outlook. Minor peripheral wars have
tended to derive from what Fearon (2004)
describes as ‘sons of the soil’ insurgencies. In a
recent article, Fearon and Laitin (2011) reveal
that in nearly a third of ethnic civil wars since
1945, the conflict develops between members of a
regional ethnic group that considers itself to be
the indigenous ‘sons of the soil’ (autochthons in
French) and recent migrants from other parts of
the country (allogènes). The migrants are typically
members of the dominant ethnic group who
migrate in search of land or government jobs,
often supported by the state with economic
incentives and development schemes. In some
ways, one could understand the civil war in Côte
d’Ivoire as a combination of two types of war, a
conventional civil war opposing a divided army
and political class, and a ‘sons of soil’ insurgency
in the west. In fact, the indigenous youth
returning from Abidjan and other big cities of
Côte d’Ivoire where they were unable to find
work, denounced the selling of land to migrants
and immigrants by their parents, claiming that
the piece of land, their inheritance, was sold
without their consent. However, as this article will
show, the political dynamics in the west cannot be
fully dissociated from the national crisis and the
conventional civil war facing both parties. 
Conventional civil wars are distinguished from
irregular or guerrilla wars because there is
comparatively strong military control of
populations. Violence against civilians is
therefore less concerned with military
competition. Direct violence2 is generally the
result of civilians directly interacting with
military actors. Civilians may ‘denounce their
neighbours, help identify them, or even arrest
them (this enhances a group’s capacity to
assassinate the civilian supporters of its rival)’
(Balcells 2010: 4–5). Civilians can also aid in
hiding ‘potential victims, they can help them flee
to other places, or they can give false indications
to the groups (this constrains the lethal capacity
of groups)’ (ibid.). Direct violence against
civilians during conventional civil war is
‘counterintuitive’ because there is little apparent
gain for armed groups in killing civilians under
their control. Violence that does occur against
civilians tends to take place as a result of
acquiring additional territory (Balcells 2010: 5) –
which was clearly the case in Côte d’Ivoire where
the ‘New Forces’ took town after town following
the fall of the geostrategic town of Duékoué. 
The targeting of civilians is typically the result of
‘pre-war political alignments’ (Balcells 2010:
6–7). Balcells posits two hypotheses: 
1 ‘The greater the degree of pre-war electoral
parity between groups, the higher the level of
direct violence perpetrated by the armed group
controlling the locality’ (Balcells 2009: 9).
2 ‘The greater the electoral support towards a
group during the pre-war period, the greater
the likelihood that a locality will be the target
of indirect violence by the enemy group’
(Balcells 2009: 10). 
Direct violence is not linearly associated with the
number of supporters of the enemy group (i.e.
we do not observe greater leftist violence in
places with a greater proportion of rightist
supporters) as one could naively assume (i.e. the
‘non-domination hypothesis’); instead the
relationship is curvilinear. There tends to be
greater violence in locales in which there is
greater ‘parity between political blocs’ as there
are stronger incentives to shift the balance of
power (Balcells 2009: 25). Earlier work by Barron
et al. (2004) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) also
seems to confirm this hypothesis. 
This counterintuitive hypothesis is interesting
for our work in that it can both explain the logic
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and restraint of violence in the west. However,
this hypothesis is very difficult to check as
demographic and ethnic data are either not
available or not adequately collected. The
different results of the presidential, legislative
and municipal elections nonetheless give us a
good idea of parity between political parties in
the different towns examined. In fact, the case of
Duékoué seems to confirm this hypothesis with
regards to the logic of violence. But Gagnoa and
San Pedro also have a certain parity between
political parties and nonetheless have had no
violence, at least during the 2010–11 events.3
Although this hypothesis provides a key
contribution in structuring a spatial analysis, it
may become problematic in contexts where the
civil war is lengthy and has been going on
through different episodes, as in the Ivorian case
(2002–12). In fact, data analysis on conflict
duration of civil war has shown that
‘[A]utonomy-seeking peripheral region
insurgencies and “sons-of-the-soil” movements
(fought by the local majority against
immigrants) tend to last much longer’ (Blattman
and Miguel 2009: 43), bringing us back to our
first point that we also need to understand the
factors that might constrain violence. 
Understanding the historical trajectories of
violence and its restraint is therefore key for a
better understanding of the conflict. A number of
other explanations could help us to explain the
historical dynamics of the conflict. Historical
economic analysis, for example, could highlight
the impact of the price of cocoa on the causes and
dynamics of the conflict. This is certainly an
important dimension to keep in mind as Côte
d’Ivoire leads the world in the production and
export of cocoa beans. One of the interviewees in
the town of Guiglo actually mentioned that the
market price of cocoa beans had an impact on the
cycle of violence. The problem with this
explanation is in fact the opposite to Balcells’
hypothesis (Balcells 2009); it does not help to
explain the variation and constraints of violence
in the region throughout which cocoa is produced.
Ashutosh Varshney’s (2002) work on India has
argued that fragmented social infrastructures,
where participation in associational structures
and informal networks consolidates identities and
interests along, rather than across, religious and
ethnic lines, explains variation in violence and
peace in otherwise similar areas. He argues that
especially in urban areas, day-to-day interactions
are sufficient to provide a bridge across
ethnic/religious groups and stop conflicts from
escalating into communal violence. Communal
violence therefore proves less likely in cities
where associations can act as bridges across
groups (Barron et al. 2004: 9–10). This hypothesis
is very interesting for Côte d’Ivoire as it could
explain why, in urban areas in the west, violence
has diminished in contrast to rural areas. This
has inspired other work on social cohesion and
levels of trust. Levels of trust and the charisma of
key individuals play a further role in shaping the
scale of violence. Bhavnani and Backer (2000)
argue that low levels of inter-ethnic trust during
conflict results in higher levels of violence. This is
because communities with weak levels of trust
are likely to maintain moderate levels of violence
over longer timeframes. This indicates that the
trustworthiness among competing groups is just
as important as levels of trust within them when
perpetrating violence. 
Mkandawire (2002: 181) explains rural violence
as follows: the African rural setting is generally
deeply inimical to liberation war, because
peasants enjoy direct control over their own land,
and surplus expropriation takes place through
the market, rather than through an exploitative
landlord class. The African situation, too, has
tended to favour ‘roving’ rather than ‘stationary’
rebellions, in Olson’s terms (Olson 1993); many
rebels are merely passing through the
countryside, on their way to seek power in towns.
Having little in common with the peasantry, and
nothing to offer it, they resort to violence as the
only way to control it. However incoherent their
objectives, and however brutal their methods,
rebellions nonetheless reflect a serious urban
malaise that needs to be addressed.
A further variable to explain this urban/rural
paradox is security. Barron et al. (2004: 29–30)
have shown that the presence of communal
security arrangements is associated with lower
levels of conflict in rural areas. Local governance
arrangements are also key for mediating
potential conflict. Barron et al. (2004: 31–2)
found that the absence of a democratically
elected village council is associated with a higher
conflict potential. As we will see in our study,
local governance institutions and key
personalities have played a key role in
restraining violence. 
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Map 1 Côte d’Ivoire: mapping urban and rural violence after the 2011 post-electoral crisis
Redrawn from www.parti-ecologique-ivoirien.org/contact/carte-administrative-de-cote-d-ivoire.php.
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Finally, land tenure and mercenary recruitment
are two additional elements important in the
Ivorian context that are often highlighted as key
factors in the dynamics of civil war. While formal
land tenure may not necessarily denote security
of tenure (World Bank 2003), Bennet (2002)
emphasises, for example, that lack of clarity in
land rights may be an important factor associated
with conflict, while Barron et al. (2004: 8) suggest
that the absence of formal property rights for
private agricultural land may make this a trigger
for violent conflict, especially as land grows more
scarce. Macours (2009: i), writing on India,
further ‘[s]hows that recruiting by Maoists
through abduction of young people was more
intensive in districts where inequality between
the landed and the landless had previously
increased’. This is particularly important as one
could observe that the army coming from Bouake
was more of a professional army compared to the
west where the army was recruiting many
mercenaries. This could explain both why
violence was more widespread in the west and
why recruitment was possible. 
If the literature on civil war fails to account for
these dynamics, one would have expected scholars
in peace studies to have researched these spaces
of ‘peace in conflict’. However, since the discipline
has been influenced and built around concepts of
structural violence (Galtung 1969), useful
approaches in terms of conflict transformation
essentially have been applied in post-conflict
settings or peaceful societies (Howell and Willis
1989) and most peace scholars have not engaged
with issues related to physical violence. 
Overall, the debates have progressed as far as
decoupling micro-level conceptual explanations for
physical violence from general theories on conflict
and war but they have failed to explain the
dynamics of ‘peace havens’ for non-combatants
during conflict and war. Existing theories have
mostly studied violence through a war and conflict
lens by focusing on the perspective of the insurgents
or on the government, or even sometimes on the
victims. However, by focusing on the perpetrators
and victims of violence, the existing theories ignore
other political actors and other geographical spaces
in civil wars where the level of violence was low or
non-existent. The narratives and theoretical
explanations that emerge from the perspective of
insurgents, government and victims may overstate
the lack of social cohesion or insecurity. 
By looking at the perspective of other political
actors in the conflict, one could broaden the
debates on violence and civil war from those that
strictly look at the causes of variation of violence
to those that focus on other important elements
such as the strategies used by third-party actors
(to avoid using the term neutral) to escape from
violence. It appears that there is still a strong
bias in the current literature (that can be partly
explained by earlier theories on civil war) to
focus on a polarised view of society with, to put it
simply, one camp opposed to the other. There are
two major problems with this view. Firstly, on a
political level, the ‘third wave of democratisation’
has opened the spaces for alternative views and
hence the number of political parties has been
growing and diversifying throughout the African
continent. Although civil war usually implies a
dispute between the ruling party and the major
opposition party, there are still a number of
influential actors that may situate themselves
outside of the dispute by not taking a particular
side. These actors nonetheless can still play an
important role during a conflict. Secondly, on a
societal level, there are still a number of
individuals and ‘groups’ that consider that a
resort to military confrontation and physical
violence is not necessary. 
4 The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire and violence in
the west 
The civil war started on 19 September 2002. The
government of Gbagbo was threatened by a
rebellion in the north and the west4 and the
country became divided into three areas. A
reconciliation process under international auspices
was started in 2003. Several thousand French and
then West African troops intervened under a UN
mandate to maintain peace in the country. 
Elections were finally organised in November 2010.
Gbagbo was designated as the presidential
candidate of the ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien
(FPI, Ivorian Popular Front), Alassane Ouattara,
who was prime minister from 1990–3, was
designated as the presidential candidate of the
Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR, Rally of
the Republicans), and Henri Konan Bédié, who
was president of Côte d’Ivoire from 1993–9, ran as
the presidential candidate of his party, the Parti
Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI,
Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire). However, the
results become a source of dispute between
Gbagbo and Ouattara, leading to a cycle of
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violence and armed confrontations between the
insurgents and the army. According to our
interview with the US ambassador in Côte d’Ivoire,
Ouattara decided on the military option when
seven women were assassinated in Abobo and he
concluded that political negotiation had failed.
One can distinguish two major dynamics of
violence: an urban repressive violence that
targeted Muslim Ivorians of northern provenance
and West African nationals; and a rural violence,
primarily between ‘autochtones’ and ‘allogènes’
(Straus 2011). Most of the urban violence was in
Abidjan and Duékoué and the rural violence
occurred in the western part of the country, in
the rural areas around Blolequin, Duékoué,
Guiglo, and Toulepleu (see Map 1).
We have much more knowledge about urban
violence than rural violence, as the dynamics of
rural violence have been less well documented. As
pointed out by Straus (2011), many lingering
questions remain about the violence in the west,
including why certain rural towns but not others
were flashpoints, who precisely were the
perpetrators, and how extensive was the violence. 
Most of the reported violence has only focused on
urban casualties. Table 1 summarises the
perceived major sites of violence in the west
against civilians according to international
organisations (IOs) and international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs). The
number of victims in Duékoué has been a major
point of debate. While the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considers
that more than 800 civilians were killed on
29 March 2011 (ICRC 2011), the United Nations
Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) contests this
number and talks about 330 victims (Le Monde
2011).5 However, during our fieldwork, we found
that rural violence had been very widespread.
The current death toll in the west is estimated at
more than 500 deaths. The data above are not
exhaustive. In fact, during our fieldwork, it was
reported to us that there had also been violence
against civilians in the town of Issia. One could
distinguish two different phases in this dynamic
of violence in the west – the first one is a
dynamic of retaliation and reprisal from January
to March (a spiral pattern of reprisal killing,
sometimes on a large scale, in which civilians of
one group are collectively punished for the
violence of their co-ethnics) and a second phase
of pacification and domination by the Forces
Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) from
April onwards (see Straus 2011). The situation is
still unstable; an administrative officer for the
Moyen Cavally region reported to the
International Crisis Group (ICG) in May 2011
that the security situation is likely to worsen,
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Table 1 Post-electoral incidents in the west in 2011 according to INGOs and IOs
Date Location Event Source
3 January Duékoué 35 civilians killed and more than 100 wounded, and 230 houses Amnesty 
burnt down. Reprisal and counter reprisal attacks by both International 2011
allogène and Guéré populations following the killing of an 
allogène female trader by an autochthon Guéré highwayman
Mid March Duékoué 100 Dioula (allogènes) murdered by pro-Gbagbo forces Minority Rights 
Group 
International 2011
22 March Bedi-Goazon At least 37 West African immigrants killed by pro-Gbagbo Human Rights 
militias and Liberian mercenaries Watch 2011a; 
2011b
28 March Blolequin More than 100 men, women and children from northern Human Rights 
Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring West African countries killed Watch 2011b
by pro-Gbagbo militias and Liberian mercenaries
29 March Duékoué 330 or 800* Guéré killed by pro-Ouattara forces Le Monde 2011
* 330 or 800 respectively according to UN or ICRC.
Source Author’s own.
with fears that the conflict is being transformed
into an inter-ethnic confrontation rather than
economic one (i.e. land) (ICG 2011).
While the political climate is one of fear, and the
data in Table 1 may reveal a cycle of urban
violence in the post-electoral crisis, violence
against civilians was mainly concentrated in
Duékoué, Bedi-Goazon and Blolequin. All the
other major towns had no signs of violence (we
focused on Gagnoa, Guiglo and San Pedro, but this
is also true of Daloa, Divo, Fresco, Oumé,
Sassandra, Soubré and Tai). On the other hand,
rural violence was widespread in the villages of
Soubré (Ottawa, Zogbodoua, Liguiyo), Sassandra
(Sago mainly), Duékoué (Toa Zeo, Blodi, Guinglo
Zia, Yorozon, Guitrozon, Fingolo, Behoue, Dahoua,
Niambli), Blolequin (Zeaglo, Beoue, Doke, Meo)
and Toulepleu (Toulepleu village, Seizahibli). 
5 The causes of the conflict in the west
While the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire has been
described as a north–south conflict, the epicentre
of the conflict and violence was the western
region (Région des 18 Montagnes, Région du
Haut-Sassandra and Région du Bas-Sassandra,
see Map 1). Of course, the largest city, Abidjan,
suffered from military and civilian casualties,
especially during the post-electoral crisis
(2011–12). However, the west has been the
battlefield since 2002 (Gaulme 2003) and the
region in fact shows that the underlying
structural causes of the conflict go beyond the
concept of Ivoirité and the leadership battle
between Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bédié
and Alassane Ouattara. These underlying causes
include the impact of former president
Houphouët-Boigny’s (as well as colonial) policies
in the region, the repression of politicians of
ethnic Bété origins, the politics of modernisation
and the management of the land and
agricultural policy (see Dozon 2011). 
Modernisation policies, in terms of agricultural
reform under the government of Houphouët-
Boigny, propelled Côte d’Ivoire to become the
world’s major producer of cocoa beans. The
western region has been central to the
production of cocoa since 1987. However, this was
not without consequences. The expropriation of
land to accommodate the port of San Pedro, as
well as those displaced to the cocoa region as a
result of the Koussou dam, is still part of the
collective memory of autochthons. This is not to
say that the region as a whole has not benefited
from this migration, but it was allowed to
develop in an unplanned way. No rules or
regulations were established, especially after
Houphouët-Boigny’s famous slogan, ‘the land
belongs to those who put it to good use’. Land
disputes became inevitable. 
The crisis took on a political dimension following
the economic crisis that hit Côte d’Ivoire in the
early 1980s and the advent of multipartism in
the early 1990s. The rise of multipartism, which
led to the resurgence of ethno-linguistic and
regional political discourses, reanimated
problems of the past in the region. In the forest
regions, the political party of President
Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI, was perceived as
the one that had legitimised the presence of
‘foreigners’. Some citizens from the western
region felt that the political authority was
organising migration without involving the
traditional authorities, thereby guaranteeing an
unstable relationship between the landowners
and the migrants. Whether this is the case or
not, the problem lay in the fact that the
migration process did not abide by any legal
framework. Furthermore, the traditional chiefs
had lost their legitimacy and authority as they
had been politicised since the advent of
multipartism, and could not play their potential
role as alternative mediators.
This legal vacuum, as well as the dualism between
political and traditional authority, created the
basis for the land crisis that started when young
students native to this region returned to their
homes. Confronted with unemployment in
Abidjan and other major cities, the youth
returned to the west to discover that their
families’ land had been leased or sold, creating a
number of tensions between the autochthones and
the migrants. The temptation by this group to
regain control of what they saw as their land
created a number of conflicts with the migrants.
This crisis was further exacerbated by its political
instrumentalisation with the concept of Ivoirité
under the presidency of Henry Konan Bédié,
which treated the migrants (even those from the
north of the country) as not being genuinely
Ivorian (Chauveau 2000). Indeed, the new Land
Law was produced in an ethno-nationalist
context, allowing some dubious interpretations by
various local politicians. This new law in fact
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brought back to the forefront the tensions that
existed between natives and migrants, not only
between Ivorians and migrants from
neighbouring countries but also migrants from
other regions of Côte d’Ivoire. Social cohesion is
not only affected by these tensions between
migrants and landowners, but also by the
tensions between the disillusioned unemployed
educated youth and the elders and migrants that
had developed a special relationship. There is a
sense of betrayal from the viewpoint of the youth
who consider that their parents have leased the
family land at a time when they needed it the
most. Some youths have therefore started
contesting these arrangements and have started
leasing the land to other migrants, creating
complex and explosive situations within families
and between migrants. 
In 2002, national politics became further confused
with the divisions in the region. Many people from
the Yacouba region considered Laurent Gbagbo to
be behind the assassination in 2002 of former
General Guéï, which had important implications
for the region as he was a Yacouba from the
western Région des 18 Montagnes. This created a
division between the Guérés and the Yacouba, very
similar to the one observed in Liberia. Obviously
the civil war in Liberia reinforced and nurtured
these divisions. Political parties and militias at the
local level, and ideological and political division at
the national level, created a new boundary
between the north-west and the south-west. The
creation of two new political parties, the
Mouvement Patriotique du Grand Ouest
(MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la
Paix (MJP), is an illustration of this new divide. As
a counter-weight, the pastor Gammi created in
2005 the Mouvement de Libération de l’Ouest de
la Côte d’Ivoire (MILOCI). This division is new in
the Ivorian political landscape and continues to
exist up to the present day with the creation of the
Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte
d’Ivoire (UDPCI), that now represents the
Yacouba group, and the recent election of Mabri
Touakeusse as the president of the regional council
of Danané, and as a member of parliament. 
Finally, the increase in the price of cocoa since
2002 (see Figure 1) has also accentuated the
crisis with the expulsion of many Burkinabé in
the Région des 18 Montagnes. Producing cocoa
and hévéa (rubber) became an attractive business
and landowners wanted to benefit from it.
Although migrants were expelled from their
lands, a narrative commonly heard was that the
flow of migration in the region did not stop but
actually increased because of terrible droughts
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Figure 1 Price of cocoa beans per tonne, 2002–12
Source www.data.worldbank.org.
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in other Western African countries and new
illegal plots being developed in the sacred forests. 
One can distinguish six major issues in the south-
west (Gagnoa, Soubré) and the west (Man, Guiglo):
1 The frustration of the Bété population within
the Ivorian nation (Dozon 2011); 
2 The land tenure issue in the context of an
urban economic crisis which has created inter-
ethnic and inter-generational disputes and
political instability; 
3 The declining legitimacy and authority of
traditional chiefs;
4 The desire for revenge among the Yacouba
population following the assassination of
General Guéï;
5 The proximity with Liberia and the impact of
civil war on the region;
6 The price of cocoa.
6 Gagnoa, Guiglo and San Pedro
We decided to focus our study of the factors
constraining violence during the civil war on
three major towns in the west, namely Gagnoa,
Guiglo and San Pedro, for the following reasons:
The town of Gagnoa is seen as the capital city for
the Bété ethnic group of the former president
Laurent Gbagbo. It is a very important town in
the political history of Côte d’Ivoire as Kragbé
Gnangbé, who had created an opposition
political party against Houphouët-Boigny in the
1970s, is also from this region. It essentially
symbolises the major political opposition to
Houphouët-Boigny’s rule from the 1970s to the
1990s. In this political bastion, one therefore
could have expected a strong resistance against
the New Forces by the population and militias in
order to defend the president, especially since
every presidential election since 1995 was
followed by the killing of civilians (see Table 2). 
The town of Guiglo is just 15 miles away from the
town of Duékoué. While the towns of Duékoué,
Toulepleu, and Blolequin (see Map 1), as well as
the rural areas surrounding these towns, have
suffered major civilian massacres, Guiglo has not
been affected by a high level of violence against
civilians. This provides a very interesting case for
our research in that the town had a strong militia
governed by Mao Glofiehi and the town was also
under the rule of a military prefect. Liberian
mercenaries, under the leadership of one so-
called ‘Bob Marley’, were also present. 
The town of San Pedro is the most important
town in economic terms in the west, as it
constitutes the biggest port for cocoa export in
the world. The wealthy Lebanese community was
very close to Gbagbo, and Young Patriots (les
Jeunes Patriotes, a youth militia movement)
were also very present, including the nephew of
Blé Goudé (Goudé was the leader of the Young
Patriots movement). 
In order to understand the dynamics of restraint
in Côte d’Ivoire, we conducted 40 semi-structured
interviews in Abidjan and in the three towns
examined. In Abidjan, we interviewed journalists,
university researchers and international civil
servants at ONUCI. In the three towns in the
west, we conducted interviews with Young
Patriots, the military, the business community,
traditional leaders, and representatives of
women’s NGOs and the religious community. 
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Table 2 Cycle of violence in Gagnoa, 1995–2010
October 1995 (after the presidential elections) 17 civilians killed following violence between the Bété and the
Baoulé and many displaced
26 October 2000 (after the presidential elections) 2 civilians killed and 5 injured, involving combat between 
militants from the FPI and RDR
November 2003 Hundreds of migrants flee from villages neighbouring 
Gagnoa, leading to 8 civilians killed and 11 injured
7–9 November 2004 Violent intercommunal outbreaks leading to 7–15 civilians 
killed and 29–59 injured
11 August 2005 2 UN military observers attacked by Young Patriots
18 February 2010 (following the dissolution of the 5 civilians killed and 11 injured following a political 
national unity government) demonstration organised by the opposition parties
7 The dynamics of restraint 
It is important that micro-level histories do not
ignore the national environment’s role in
shaping and containing violence. The following
factors are important for understanding why the
conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, which had the potential
to turn into genocide, did not.
The first key factor is the role of the army in the
crisis. In most of the towns we visited, there were
no direct confrontations between the New Forces
and the army that was under the orders of
Gbagbo. In fact, since 2002, there has been a
crisis of confidence between the former
president, Laurent Gbagbo and the army. While
General Philippe Mangou was the Chief of Staff
of the army, he had no real control over the
military’s strategic decisions. Vagba Faussigno
(Commander of the Navy under Gbagbo), Guiai
Bi Poin (Commander of the Centre for Security
Operations – CECOS – under Gbagbo), and
General Dogbo Ble Denis (Commander of the
Republican Guard under Gbagbo) were the key
individuals in the army headquarters. It is
unclear how loyal the other sections of the army
were besides these three regiments. This largely
reveals the underlying structural tensions within
the army in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, since
Houphouët-Boigny, there have been many
attempted coups d’etat which resulted in purges
of the army. As a result, it has been difficult to
build a republican army. The army, up to the
present day, is a clan-based army.
This lack of confidence led to the creation of
parallel militias and mercenaries and the young
militant movement, the Young Patriots. The
army was either neutral or was slowly taking
sides with Alassane Ouattara. Many interviewees
talked about a lost war. In fact, there were many
in the army that changed sides after the 2010
presidential elections. It was reported during our
field trip that the military commander in charge
of the second battalion of Daloa changed sides
during the war. This was the most important
military installation in the west besides
Duékoué. In fact, it has been estimated that
63 per cent of security forces (including the
police and gendarmerie) had voted in favour of
Alassane Ouattara (Zion 2011).
The second key factor is the changing nature of
the Young Patriots movement. One could argue
that the movement transformed itself from an
ideological, political, military force to an
organisation of corrupted people; demobilised
militiamen engaged in organised crime and
gangster activity. In San Pedro, for example, it
was reported that different sorts of illegal taxes
(road, consumer and property taxes) were
collected by the movement. An interviewee in
Gagnoa, a local leader of the Young Patriots, told
us that this can be explained by the fact that the
most radical elements had left to be enrolled in
the national army (3,000 in 2003 and 3,000 in
2009).
Thirdly, the New Forces, and especially the
Dozos, were feared, at least in the western
region, for their mystic powers. Similar to Sierra
Leone, these groups were believed to have
magical powers to become invisible soldiers. In
addition, Dozos have the reputation of killing
any adversary they have and of being invincible.
After the first battle in Duékoué, one should not
underestimate the impact of fear and rumours
on the logic of the restraint of violence. 
Finally, one should not forget that the
government of national unity in 2005 created a
new dynamic in the conflict, and the different
sides were not as polarised as it may first seem.
In fact, during 2005–10, there were no major
violent events in the towns in which we
conducted our fieldwork. This coalition
government certainly had an effect on political
alignment and stability in society, although the
underlying tensions were still present. In fact, in
February 2010, as soon as the government and
the independent electoral commission were
dissolved, violent incidents occurred in the town
of Gagnoa resulting in five deaths and 11
injured. Nonetheless, this period was marked by
ambiguity in terms of political alignment. For
example, it is unclear to whom the former prime
minister and now president of the National
Assembly, Guillaume Soro, was aligned. Rumours
after the election were circulated that 100 per
cent of the votes in his home village were for
Laurent Gbagbo. Another interesting fact in this
messy political dynamic was that Mao Glofiehi,
the principal leader of the Young Patriots in the
Guiglo region, revealed after being arrested that
he had met Soro after a failed assassination
attempt on the former prime minister.
At the local level, we found four major factors
leading to restraint. Probably the most important,
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and to a certain extent surprising for external
observers of the region, is the level of motivation.
We argued above that the Young Patriot
movement changed during 2002–12. At the local
level in Gagnoa and San Pedro, the Young Patriots
interviewed (those in Guiglo had essentially fled)
considered that the local politicians had betrayed
them. On the one hand, during the post-electoral
crisis, arms were apparently not delivered to the
Young Patriots, especially in Gagnoa. In fact, it was
reported that Bertin Kadet Gahie, former
Minister of Defence under Laurent Gbagbo, was
travelling to Gagnoa to provide arms when he had
an accident. In addition, some of the local
authorities who had arms did not give them to the
Young Patriots. They also shared with us that all
the DDR6 promises in terms of training and
indemnisation were never realised. It is difficult to
say whether this low level of motivation would
have been a deterrent if they had had the
opportunity to bear arms during the crisis. (In
Rwanda and Sierra Leone violence was
perpetrated with quite primitive weapons).
However, an important incident in Gagnoa may
indeed confirm that the trust in local politicians
and the desire to fight for their president was
slipping away. In Gagnoa, there was an explosive
situation as the security forces had deserted their
barracks and the youth from both political wings
had stolen all the arms. What happened was that
robbery in the major shop of the town became
more attractive for both youth groups and acted as
a dynamic of restraint. The situation could have
easily degenerated but both groups were together
in the shop and all became young individuals
interested in immediate material gain rather than
political confrontation. There was a low level of
mobilisation from the population too, especially in
Gagnoa. This is all the more surprising as this is
the home town of Laurent Gbagbo. The Bété
population did not feel that they had fully
benefited from any presidential favour.
Untarmacked roads in the town of Gagnoa were
often given as an example. In fact the major road
axes between Gagnoa–Oumé and Gagnoa–Soubré
were not in good shape. Overall, the Bété region
has not received many benefits in terms of
economic and social development programmes or
infrastructural development (apart from the
Chinese-funded new hospital in Gagnoa). 
The second major factor is that unlike many civil
wars in the region, state institutions and local
governance remains strong and well respected.
In our interviews, we noticed that in the three
municipalities, the role of the governors, sub-
governors and mayors were vital. In the long
term, they have derived their authority from
mediating land disputes. This was especially the
case with Mr Gauze Ignace Desire, the current
sub-governor of Gagnoa. There was one major
incident in the town of Gagnoa during the post-
electoral crisis. A young Baoulé peasant was
burnt by the Young Patriots. The sub-governor
intervened straight away and managed to find a
negotiated solution between the different
communities. In Guiglo, Yahi Octave from the
departmental council and Ahoua Touré from
Duékoué have played an active role in mediating
potential conflict. Reconciliation efforts are
made through: the inter-ethnic alliances and
joking kinships whose main function is to defuse
conflict situations between allied communities;
the purification of the earth and the sacrifices
initiated by the masks society; and the actions of
civil society. These various initiatives have so far
helped to consolidate social cohesion. Obviously
there are limits to these conflict resolution
techniques, as these seemed to have worked in
Guiglo but not in Duékoué. 
Not only state and political authorities were
active but also religious figures. In San Pedro, one
of the imams realised how explosive the situation
could become as most of the youth were armed
following the departure of the security forces. He
created his own disarmament programme by
asking all the youngsters to deliver their arms to
his house. Some enlightened individuals,
including some military commanders from the
New Forces, also played a key role in restraining
the dynamics of violence. Many interviewees in
Guiglo mentioned the name of the Commander
Moses and the Lieutenant Touré. 
The last major factor in these three towns was
social cohesion. While conflict between different
communities clearly exists, the threat of external
actors creates a sense of solidarity within these
towns. The most revealing example was in the
town of Guiglo where Liberian mercenaries were
expelled from town by all the different
communities after they started attacking the
migrant community. There are several factors that
could explain this social cohesion. The first one is
that inter-community marriages are quite
widespread and while some neighbourhoods were
labelled with a particular community
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(e.g. Dioulabougou in Gagnoa), individuals live
across the different spaces irrespective of their
neighbourhood denotation. Many Young Patriots
in Gagnoa were living in Dioulabougou, which may
be surprising. Of course, extensive inter-marriage
between Hutu and Tutsi did not stop the genocide
in Rwanda. Inter-marriage cannot be a restraining
factor on its own. The second factor reinforcing
social cohesion is that a number of conflict
resolution programmes like the GIZ Programme
on Peace and Development clearly enabled some
of the youth to access alternative livelihoods and
reinforced social cohesion. Besides GIZ, CARE
International was running a peace programme.
Peace committees were set up in villages (between
Duékoué and Bangolo). These peace committees
were in charge of preventing further violence by
solving any issue coming up in the villages. Some
of the peace committees are still functioning today.
The World Food Programme (WFP) has
implemented a ‘cash for work’ peace dividend
programme aimed at supporting people who work
either on their farms or contribute to
implementing a project of common interest. In the
west, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has
broadcast radio programmes promoting social
cohesion. By implementing this programme,
SFCG has financially supported local radios.
Although international organisations have been
active in the west, it is unfortunate that except for
CARE International, these programmes have been
less active in the villages. In addition, a big failure
of these programmes was that they could not
address the land tenure issue.
8 Conclusion
This article has focused on a surprisingly
neglected topic as strategies to restrain violence
can inform policymakers on conflict resolution
mechanisms. Whether it is due to a lack of
material on the topic or because it is inextricably
linked to the logic of violence and the political
dynamics of the civil war, it has been difficult to
concentrate our analysis exclusively on the
dynamics of restraint in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact,
concentrating on individuals and communities
would have bypassed one of the major reasons for
the dynamic of restraint. In line with Straus
(2012), the national environment, and in
particular the institutions of the army and
militias, proved to be a decisive factor in this
dynamic of restraint. The few cases of urban
violence are properly explained by local factors
and isolated from the rest of the country.
Otherwise there would have been domino effects
across the major urban areas in the west. The
recent events in July 20127 in Duékoué show a
particular political history and tragedy that has
been going on in this town for the last ten years
around revenge and retaliation.
The second important aspect relates to different
dynamics of violence and restraint in rural and
urban areas. In urban areas, local governance
institutions and important personalities have
proved to be key figures in the constraint of
violence. This was not the case in rural areas
where the governor and sub-governor had no
physical presence and where the traditional
chiefs had lost their authority and legitimacy.
This reveals the specificity of the civil war in
Côte d’Ivoire which is unusual in that it took
place in a country with strong state institutions.
While state local institutions were legitimate
and strong enough to contain violence in urban
areas, the declining authority of chiefs in rural
areas meant that no mediator existed in the
rural spaces to contain violence. 
Researching the reasons for restraints on
violence also led us to ask questions about the
different outcomes that could have happened in
western Côte d’Ivoire. If there had been no
rebellion in northern Côte d’Ivoire and if
General Guéï had not been assassinated, would
western Côte d’Ivoire be different from how it is
today? Our analysis has highlighted that the
problems of land ownership must be a central
concern for the stabilisation of the western
region. Land tenure issues result from
governance failures dating from the period of
Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The strategic
importance of this region (the main area of
cocoa production) requires the resolution of
problems of cohabitation. The search for peace
and national reconciliation must begin in the
west, especially as the stigma and the
politicisation of the Ivorian conflict as a north–
south conflict cannot mask the major problem of
the Ivorian crisis: the issue of land ownership. It
is unfortunate that peace programmes in the
west did not sufficiently address this issue. Most
programmes, except for CARE International,
were focusing on promoting social cohesion and
mainly in towns. The new government has shown
some positive signs of will to solve the issue of
land tenure but it will be a difficult political
game given the current coalition with the PDCI,
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as well as the positive relationship with President
Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. Furthermore,
the new security situation in the west following
the crisis and the presence of Dozos, or newly
initiated Dozos, has rendered the land issue
more fragile and explosive. The land issue in
Côte d’Ivoire, and in the west particularly, is far
from being resolved. 
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